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1 Generally, auditor changes involve the repl
the ﬁnancial statements of a company. We are
dissolution.Using listed companies in China’s A-share market from 1997 to 2009, this
paper investigates the relationship between controller changes (including
changes in controlling shareholders, directors and CEOs) and auditor changes.
The empirical evidence indicates that controller changes are positively related
to auditor changes and that auditor changes are more likely if there are exten-
sive controller changes. For companies in which both the controlling share-
holder and the auditor change, if the successor controlling shareholder is
controlled by an other-province government, the auditor is more likely to be
replaced and the successor auditor is more likely to be a smaller auditor from
the same province as the new controlling shareholder.
 2012 China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen
University and City University of Hong Kong. Production and hosting by
Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Auditor changes (or auditor switches)1 and opinion shopping have been the subject of considerable concern
from investors, regulators and researchers. The extant research has identiﬁed several reasons for companies to
change auditors, including the desire to decrease audit fees, improve the credibility of annual reports, improve
audit quality, lower agency costs, obtain a more favorable audit opinion, etc. (Firth, 1999). Of these, opinion
shopping, whereby management replaces the incumbent auditor with one who will accept more aggressiveurnal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of
ier B.V. All rights reserved.
acement, through dismissal or resignation, of the accounting ﬁrm (not the CPA) that audits
not concerned with involuntary auditor changes, such as changes caused by accounting ﬁrm
Table 1
The probability of controlling shareholder change, chairman change and CEO change.
Controlling shareholder change
(%)
Chairman change
(%)
CEO change
(%)
Any change
(%)
Sample with auditor changes (n = 1169) 20.7 32.5 36.5 52.3
Sample without auditor changes
(n = 13,238)
5.9 18.6 23.4 34.6
Diﬀerence 14.8*** 13.9*** 13.1*** 17.7***
*** Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 2
Average ROA and the probabilities of receiving a qualiﬁed opinion, controller change and auditor change.
Average ROA 60.15 (0.15, 0.05] (0.05, 0.05] >0.05 All
The probability of receiving a qualiﬁed opinion in the previous year (%) 60.5 30.1 16.5 5.5 11.3
The probability of controlling shareholder change in this year (%) 17.4 14.2 8.9 5.5 7.1
The probability of main business change in this year (%) 3.9 3.1 1.8 1.1 1.5
The probability of chairman change in this year (%) 40.7 32.5 25.1 16.3 19.7
The probability of CEO change in this year (%) 44.3 36.6 28.8 21.5 24.6
The probability of auditor change in this year (%) 20.1 11.9 9.7 6.7 8.1
Sample size 772 741 2069 10,703 14,285
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management attempts to engage in opinion shopping are unsuccessful. In this study’s sample, companies that
change (do not change) their auditors after receiving a qualiﬁed opinion have a 64.1% (64.0%) probability of
receiving a qualiﬁed opinion.
If a company cannot obtain a more favorable opinion, why does it change its auditor after receiving a qual-
iﬁed opinion? Table 2 shows that companies receiving qualiﬁed opinions usually have poor performance and
are more likely to experience a controlling shareholder change, chairman of the board change and CEO
change. It is possible that the companies change their auditor either because the controller changes or because
the ﬁrm is performing poorly. In Beattie and Fearnley’s (1995) survey, 14% of the respondents cite “merger/
takeover with/by another company” as the reason for a change in auditor and they also ﬁnd that a change (or
consideration of a change) of auditor is associated with changes in top management. Anderson et al. (1993)
identify corporate takeovers as events that generate auditor choice decisions, the acquiring company (the
acquirer) has to choose whether to retain the new subsidiary’s (the acquiree’s) incumbent auditor or switch
to its own auditor. Firth (1999) ﬁnds that of the 175 takeovers which took place in the UK from 1976 to
1992 (in which all of the acquirers and acquirees were publicly listed companies), 141 switched the auditor
of the subsidiary to that of the acquirer and 34 retained the incumbent auditor of the subsidiary for at least
2 years following the takeover. These auditor changes were based on the perceived cost savings and eﬃciency
beneﬁts derived from the use of one auditing ﬁrm rather than two.
The transfer of controlling rights in China’s capital market oﬀers a unique opportunity to investigate the
relationship between controller changes and auditor changes. First, most of the acquirers are non-listed com-
panies. Second, most of the acquirers and acquirees are not in the same or a similar industry. Third, most of
the sellers of controlling shares are state controlled, whereas the acquirers are mixed – some are controlled by
individuals, some by the central government, some by local governments and some by other province govern-
ments (provinces other than that of the companies themselves). It is the identity (individual, central govern-
ment, local government, other-province government) of the acquirer, not the similarity of activities (main
business) of the acquirer and the acquiree (as investigated by Firth, 1999), that determines whether or not
the acquiree’s auditor is changed.
Using 14,407 observations of listed companies on China’s capital market from 1997 to 2009, this paper
ﬁnds that auditor changes are positively related to controller changes (including controlling shareholder
changes, chairman of the board changes and CEO changes). This positive relationship is more pronounced
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chairman (or CEO) change or if the predecessor and the successor controlling shareholders are not controlled
by the same government or if the successor chairman or CEO is from outside the company. I also ﬁnd that for
companies in which the controlling shareholder and auditor change, if the successor controlling shareholder is
controlled by an other-province government, the auditor is more likely to be replaced and the successor audi-
tor is more likely to be a smaller auditor from the same province as the new controlling shareholder.
This paper makes the following contributions: (1) the ﬁndings suggest that auditor changes are inﬂuenced
more by controller changes (especially controlling shareholder change) than by qualiﬁed opinions; (2) it sub-
divides the types of controlling shareholder changes, the identities of the successor controlling shareholders
and the origins of the successor chairman and CEO; and (3) it investigates how the successor controlling share-
holder chooses an auditor for the acquiree.
Zhang et al. (2010) investigate the eﬀects of controlling shareholder changes and management changes on
auditor changes and ﬁnd that management changes, rather than controlling shareholder changes, result in
auditor changes. Their ﬁndings diﬀer from those reported here, which show that controlling shareholder
changes result in auditor changes. However, I question the data used by Zhang et al. (2010). In their 7997 sam-
ple observations in the 2001–2007 period, the percentage of auditor change is 25.45%, which seems beyond
belief. For example, Wen and Ding (2007) report 8.2% auditor change in their 4444 sample observations in
the 2001–2004 period and Wu and Zhu (2010) report 12% auditor change in their 10,510 sample observations
in the 2000–2008 period and this 12% already includes mandatory auditor changes. In the sample used in this
paper, 8.1% of companies changed their auditor, and the ﬁgure is 8.7% for the 2001–2007 period. This is close
to that of Wen and Ding (2007) and Wu and Zhu (2010). I conjecture that Zhang et al.’s (2010) auditor change
sample ﬁrms include mandatory auditor changes, auditor mergers and auditor name changes.
2. Literature review and theoretical analysis
2.1. Auditor changes and opinion shopping
A large volume of literature has reported evidence indicating that companies are more likely to change their
auditors after receiving qualiﬁed opinions (Chow and Rice, 1982; Krishnan and Stephen, 1995; Li et al., 2001;
Geng and Yang, 2001; Li and Wu, 2002a). Krishnan (1994) ﬁnds that auditor changes are triggered by audi-
tors’ use of conservative judgments for some clients. However, most of the related literature ﬁnds that com-
panies that change auditors do not seem to receive “improved” opinions in the year following the change
(Chow and Rice, 1982; Krishnan, 1994), suggesting that opinion shopping is generally futile. Chen and Zhang
(2004), Wu and Tan (2005) and Wang (2006) ﬁnd similar evidence in China. Krishnan et al. (1996) even ﬁnd
that auditors are more likely to issue qualiﬁed opinions to switchers. One exception is Lennox (2000), who
ﬁnds that companies successfully engaged in opinion shopping in the UK.
China’s reinforced regulations may prevent companies from successfully engaging in opinion shopping.
Since 2002, the Chinese Institute of Certiﬁed Public Accountants (CICPAs) has introduced several mea-
sures relating to auditor changes, aimed at ensuring the independence of the successor auditor and prevent-
ing auditors from issuing improper opinions.2 The CICPA issued an “Urgent notice on further carrying out
the auditing of listed companies’ annual reports of 2001,” requiring auditors who were dismissed in the
process of auditing listed companies’ 2001 annual reports to report the events to the CICPA in writing
by the end of April. This notice illustrates the CICPA’s concern over auditor changes, which may be trig-
gered by the intention to opinion shop (Li and Wu, 2002b). On June 25th, 2002, the CICPA issued “The
guiding opinions of CPA professional ethics,” which clearly states that before accepting auditing work, the
successor auditor should inquire with the predecessor auditor the reason for the auditor change and pay
attention to the probable divergence between the auditor and management. One may conjecture that a
rational and smart management would not change auditor merely for receiving a qualiﬁed opinion (Li
and Wu, 2004).2 One example is “ZonHeng International (600862).” See Li and Wu (2002b).
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In China, few qualiﬁed opinions are actually triggered by disagreements between the auditor and the ﬁrm’s
management, as most qualiﬁed opinions are either going-concern opinions or merely emphasize some impor-
tant or abnormal events. Most of the companies that receive qualiﬁed opinions are falling into ﬁnancial dis-
tress, have made losses in the past few years and have extremely high leverage. Some of them have had
considerable sums of money misappropriated by their controlling shareholders. These companies have a high
probability of bankruptcy and the probability of auditor resignation is relatively high. Schwartz and Menon
(1985), Geng and Yang (2001) and Li and Wu (2002a) ﬁnd that auditors are more likely to resign if clients are
in ﬁnancial distress. However, companies that are in ﬁnancial distress are also more likely to go through con-
trolling shareholder changes and management changes. Table 2 shows that poor performing companies are
more likely to receive qualiﬁed opinions and also experience controller changes (including controlling share-
holder changes, chairman changes and CEO changes) and auditor changes. Thus, the reason for auditor
changes may not be qualiﬁed opinions, but poor performance or controller changes.
In China, the majority of listed companies have controlling shareholders who hold large proportions of
outstanding shares and enjoy substantial control rights, including the right to choose the auditor. Liu et al.
(2010) points out that since the establishment of the stock markets in the early 1990s, the right to choose
the auditor has been controlled by controlling shareholders and management. Zhang and Zhang (2007) note
that in the currently implemented auditor–client relationship, it is the agent of the company who chooses the
auditor. Therefore, a change in the controller (the controlling shareholder, the chairman of the board or the
CEO) may result in a change of auditor.
Beattie and Fearnley (1995), Anderson et al. (1993) and Firth (1999) note that acquiring companies change
the acquiree’s incumbent auditor. Anderson et al. (1993) and Firth (1999) focus on the similarity of the acquir-
er’s and the acquiree’s main business activities. The replacement of the acquiree’s auditor by the acquirer’s
auditor is based on the perceived cost savings and eﬃciency beneﬁts of using one auditing ﬁrm rather than
two. These cost savings and eﬃciency beneﬁts are more signiﬁcant if the acquirer and the acquiree are in
the same or a similar industry.
Transferring controlling rights in China’s capital market is a quite diﬀerent process from that in developed
capital markets. First, most acquirers are non-listed companies. Second, most acquirers and acquirees are not
in the same or a similar industry. Third, most sellers of controlling shares are stated-controlled and the acquir-
ers are mixed – some are controlled by individuals, some by the central government, some by local govern-
ments and some by other-province governments (provinces other than that of the companies themselves). It
is the identity (individual, central government, local government, other-province government) of the acquirer,
not the similarity of activities (main business) of the acquirer and the acquiree (as investigated by Firth, 1999),
that determines whether or not the acquiree’s auditor is changed.
2.3. Choice of auditors
In markets in which companies require high quality audit services, companies select appropriate auditors to
mitigate speciﬁc conditions, such as information asymmetry and agency problems. Pittman and Fortin (2004)
ﬁnd that retaining a Big Six auditor, which can reduce debt-monitoring costs by enhancing the credibility of
ﬁnancial statements, enables young ﬁrms to lower their borrowing costs. Choosing a Big Six auditor also
aﬀects ﬁrms’ interest rates less over time and particularly beneﬁts ﬁrms with short private histories that ini-
tially experience worse information problems. Using a broad sample from eight East Asian economies, Fan
and Wong (2005) document that ﬁrms with agency problems embedded in their ownership structures are more
likely to employ Big Five auditors. Lennox (2005) ﬁnds that the association between management ownership
and audit ﬁrm size is signiﬁcantly negative within low and high regions of management ownership. Using a
unique dataset of 176 privatizations from 32 countries, Guedhami et al. (2009) ﬁnd that privatized ﬁrms
worldwide are less (more) likely to appoint a Big Four auditor with the extent of state (foreign) ownership.
The basis of these studies is that it is the company (not the controller) that chooses the auditor that ﬁts the
company best.
G. Tu /China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 45–58 49In China’s capital market, there is no evidence that companies need high quality audit services. Liu et al.
(2002) points out that in the process of meeting the requirements of the regulatory authority in China, auditing
is a by-product of imitating international routines and is not necessarily needed by the capital markets. Audit
quality is not a variable in the cost-beneﬁt functions of listed companies. Companies just need a clean opinion
and it does not matter which auditor conducts the audit. In this case, the controller may choose the auditor
from his own perspective.
Wang et al. (2008) ﬁnd that compared with non-state-owned ﬁrms, Chinese state-owned enterprises con-
trolled by province, city and county governments (local SOEs) are more likely to hire small auditors from
the same region (small local auditors).
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Sample
The sample includes listed companies in China’s A-share market in the 1997–2009 period. This long period
provides a large sample size to subdivide the sample by controlling shareholder change, the identities of suc-
cessor controlling shareholders and the origins of the successor chairman and CEO. The sample starts from
1997 because controlling shareholder changes were rare before then. Every company in every year is a sample
company, but I exclude the year when the company was ﬁrst listed on the stock market because it was not
listed in the previous year. I exclude companies whose predecessor auditors were disbanded or were banned
by the regulatory authority from auditing listed companies. If two accounting ﬁrms merged, and these two
accounting ﬁrms’ clients employed the newly established accounting ﬁrm, I treat it as no auditor change. There
are 14,407 sample observations with an auditor change rate of 8.1%.
Of these 14,407 sample observations, 1022 (7.1%) changed their controlling shareholder, 2839 (19.7%)
changed their chairman of the board and 3526 (24.5%) changed their CEO. Controlling shareholder change
refers to a change in the biggest shareholder3 or the ultimate controller of the company. All related parties
are regarded as one shareholder. If shares are transferred from a father (mother) to a son (daughter) or
between shareholders controlled by the same individual, it is regarded as no transfer. Instances where the
shareholder becomes the biggest shareholder by buying shares in the secondary market, there are generally
several big shareholders or the biggest shareholder changes frequently and does not completely control the
company are also regarded as no transfer. Management buy-outs (MBOs) are regarded as no transfer because
the company was controlled by the management both before and after the MBO. There are eight methods for
changing the controlling shareholder: (1) the predecessor and the successor biggest shareholders agree on the
sale of the shares. If the government controls the shares, the change date is the day on which the agreed sale is
eventually authorized by the government. If the government does not control the shares, the change date is the
day on which the agreement is signed. (2) The biggest shareholder itself is sold out. The change date is the
same as for method (1). (3) The listed company oﬀers shares to the buyer, who then becomes the biggest share-
holder. The change date is the day on which the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) approves
the share oﬀer plan. (4) Joint venture – the predecessor biggest shareholder contributes the shares to a corpo-
ration, which is then not controlled by the biggest shareholder itself, or the acquirer invests in the predecessor
biggest shareholder and then controls it. The change date is the day on which the investment agreement is
signed. (5) The change date is the jurisdiction day if the shares are transferred by jurisdiction. (6) Shares
are not sold between the predecessor and successor biggest shareholders. The change date is the same as
for method (1). (7) Shares are transferred within the same state-controlled group. The change date is the
day on which the agreement is signed. (8) Free transfer between two state-controlled entities. The change date
is the day on which the free transfer is eventually authorized by the government. In Table 8, I exclude the last
two methods of controlling shareholder change as they are not commonly used and I obtain similar results (see
Table 8).3 If the annual reports state that the biggest shareholder does not control the company, I do not treat it as the controlling shareholder.
For example, The South Securities Co. was once the biggest shareholder of Harbin Pharmaceutical Group (600644), but the company’s
annual report identiﬁes the controlling shareholder as Harbin Pharmaceutical Co., not South Securities Co.
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Table 1 shows that for the sample with auditor changes, the probabilities of a controlling shareholder
change, chairman change and CEO change are 20.7%, 32.5% and 36.5% respectively, which are signiﬁcantly
higher than for the sample without auditor changes. For the sample with auditor changes, the probability of
one of the three types of controller change (controlling shareholder change, chairman change and CEO
change) is 52.3%, which is higher than the sample without auditor changes. The diﬀerence of 17.7% indicates
that controller changes account for 17.7% of auditor changes.
In Table 2, the sample observations are divided into four sub-samples according to average ROA (average
return on assets in the sample year and 1 year before) while excluding 122 sample companies in the ﬁnance
industry. Table 2 shows that lower ROA is associated with higher probabilities of receiving a qualiﬁed opin-
ion, controlling shareholder change, main business change, chairman change, CEO change and auditor
change. Poor performing companies are more likely to manipulate earnings and have higher audit risk, thus
the auditors are more likely to resign. Shu (2000) ﬁnds that auditors are more likely to resign from high-risk
clients. Companies that receive a qualiﬁed opinion in the previous year are more likely to disagree with audi-
tors, thus the auditors are more likely to resign. A change in the main business means that the new controlling
shareholder injects business into the company that results in the company’s main business changing. In the
case of a main business change, the cost of an auditor change is not high because the predecessor auditor
is not familiar with the new business.
3.3. Controller changes and auditor changes
Table 3 shows the probability of auditor change for the sample with (without) a controlling shareholder
change, chairman change and CEO change in each year. It shows that the probability of auditor change is
16.8% higher for the sample with a controlling shareholder change than for the sample without. The diﬀerence
between the samples with and without a chairman change (or CEO change) is also signiﬁcant. The diﬀerence
between the samples with and without a controlling shareholder change is much larger than that between the
samples with and without a chairman change (or CEO change), which indicates that compared to a chairman
change and CEO change, a controlling shareholder change has a stronger eﬀect on auditor change.
In Table 4, the sample is divided into eight sub-samples according to whether or not the controlling share-
holder, chairman and CEO change. It shows that the probability of auditor change increases with more con-
troller changes (controlling shareholder, chairman and CEO). The diﬀerence between the two sub-samples inTable 3
The probability of auditor change (%): subsample by year.
Year 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 All Diﬀerence
Sample with controlling
shareholder change
11.4 16.2 17.8 22.0 18.3 24.8 25.3 25.0 20.0 27.7 26.8 30.0 29.6 23.7 16.8***
Sample without
controlling
shareholder change
2.9 5.4 5.5 7.0 6.8 6.5 5.5 7.0 9.0 8.6 8.2 7.2 6.3 6.9
Sample with chairman
change
4.8 13.2 10.9 11.4 10.6 14.4 11.3 13.2 14.8 15.9 15.3 14.6 16.5 13.4 6.6***
Sample without
chairman change
3.3 4.5 5.1 7.5 6.9 6.3 5.7 6.7 8.2 9.0 8.3 7.2 5.8 6.8
Sample with CEO
change
4.7 9.1 9.5 12.6 9.4 13.5 11.0 12.3 15.7 11.2 15.1 9.6 15.8 12.1 5.3***
Sample without CEO
change
3.2 5.5 5.3 6.4 7.2 6.2 5.5 6.5 7.6 10.0 7.8 8.1 5.3 6.8
All 3.6 6.4 6.6 8.4 7.8 8.3 6.9 7.9 9.5 10.3 9.5 8.4 7.5 8.1
Sample size 478 683 804 891 875 1090 1186 1256 1337 1316 1372 1525 1594 14,407
*** Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 4
The probability of auditor change (%): subsample by controller change.
Controlling shareholder No
change
Change No
change
Change No
change
Change No
change
Change
Chairman No
change
No
change
No
change
No
change
Change Change Change Change
CEO No
change
No
change
Change Change No
change
No
change
Change Change
Sample size 9220 371 1860 117 1124 166 1181 368
The probability of auditor change
(%)
6.1 16.2 7.8 21.4 8.0 20.5 11.3 33.4
Diﬀerence 10.1*** 13.6*** 12.5*** 22.1***
*** Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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four groups, the probability of auditor change for companies with a controlling shareholder change is much
higher than that for companies without a controlling shareholder change. If we compare the probabilities of
auditor change between sub-samples with and without a chairman change (or CEO change), we also ﬁnd a
diﬀerence, but the diﬀerence is not as large as that between sub-samples with and without a controlling share-
holder change. This means that compared to a chairman change and a CEO change, a controlling shareholder
change has a greater eﬀect on auditor change.
3.4. The method of controlling shareholder change and the probability of auditor change
In Table 5, the sample is divided into eight sub-samples according to the method of controlling shareholder
change. I deﬁne the ﬁrst ﬁve methods as TYPE I and the last three methods as TYPE II. The controlling share-
holder change is more extensive in TYPE I than in TYPE II. The probabilities of auditor change are diﬀerent
between TYPE I and TYPE II, indicating that the auditor is more likely to be replaced if there are more exten-
sive controlling shareholder changes.Table 5
The method of controlling shareholder change and the probability of auditor change.
The method of controlling shareholder
change
N Probability of auditor
change (%)
Agreed sale of shares between the
predecessor and successor biggest
shareholders
476 26.5
The biggest shareholder is sold out 74 23.0
The listed company oﬀers shares to the
buyer
26 57.7
Joint venture 26 30.8
Shares are transferred by jurisdiction 99 28.3
Shares are sold not between the predecessor
and successor biggest shareholders
40 15.0
Shares are transferred within the same state-
controlled group
76 18.4
Free transfer between two state-controlled
entities
205 13.7
TYPE I 701 27.7
TYPE II 321 15.0
Diﬀerence 12.7***
No controlling shareholder change 13,385 6.9
*** Indicates signiﬁcance at 1%.
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probability of auditor change is 41.7%. For companies with a controlling shareholder change but no main
business change, the probability of auditor change is 20.5%. The diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant (the p-value
is 0.000).
3.5. The origins of the successor chairman and CEO and the probability of auditor change
The origin of the successor chairman and CEO implies the extent of controller change. For example, if the
successor chairman is promoted from inside (usually from the position of vice-chairman or CEO), the control-
ler change is not as severe as when the chairman is from outside.
Panel A of Table 6 shows that the probabilities of the successor chairman and CEO coming from outside
are highest for a TYPE I controlling shareholder change and lowest for companies without a controlling
shareholder change. Panel B of Table 6 shows that the auditor is more likely to be replaced if the successor
chairman (or CEO) comes from outside.
3.6. Auditor change regressions
A logistic regression model is used to test the eﬀects of a controlling shareholder change, main business
change, chairman change and CEO change on auditor change. The dependent variable AuditorChange = 1
if the auditor changes, and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables are deﬁned as follows:
 Holderchange = 1 if the controlling shareholder changes, otherwise 0.
 Businesschange = 1 if the main business changes, otherwise 0.
 Chairmanchange = 1 if the chairman changes, otherwise 0.
 CEOchange = 1 if the CEO changes, otherwise 0.
 Nonclean = 1 if the company received a qualiﬁed opinion, otherwise 0.
 ROA = average return on assets in the sample year and 1 year before; ROA is winsorized at 1% to mitigate
the inﬂuence of outliers.Table 6
The origins of the successor chairman and CEO and the probability of auditor change.
TYPE I controlling
shareholder change
TYPE II controlling
shareholder change
No change in controlling
shareholder
Panel A: The probability of the successor chairman and CEO coming from outside
The probability of the successor chairman
coming from outside (%)
83.8 64.2 45.5
The probability of the successor CEO
coming from outside (%)
71.1 58.2 39.5
All TYPE I controlling
shareholder change
TYPE II controlling
shareholder change
No change in controlling
shareholder
Panel B: The probability of auditor change (%)
The successor chairman comes
from outside
17.0 34.0 22.8 10.9
The successor chairman comes
from inside
9.4 21.7 12.8 8.7
Diﬀerence 7.6*** 12.3** 10.0 2.2*
The successor CEO comes from
outside
15.1 34.9 24.6 10.1
The successor CEO comes from
inside
9.8 29.5 12.2 8.6
Diﬀerence 5.3*** 5.4 12.4 1.5
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at 1% levels.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at 5% levels.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
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the acquirer audit ﬁrm; otherwise 0.
Merged equals 1 in 209 of the sample companies. A small audit ﬁrm being acquired by a big audit ﬁrm may
result in auditor changes. For example, in the year following Ernst & Young’s acquisition of the audit ﬁrm
DaHua, 30 of DaHua’s 46 client companies went through auditor change and 11 companies changed auditors
in the year of the merger (Chen et al., 2010; Wang and Chen, 2004).
Table 7 presents the regression results. The coeﬃcients for Holderchange, Businesschange, Chairmanchange,
CEOchange, Nonclean and Merged are all signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that a controlling shareholder
change, main business change, chairman change, CEO change, qualiﬁed opinion and auditor ﬁrm being
acquired all contribute to auditor change. The coeﬃcient for Holderchange is much larger than that for Chair-
manchange and CEOchange, indicating that controlling shareholder change has a stronger eﬀect on auditor
change. The Pseudo R2 in regressions (1)–(3) show that controller changes have strong explanatory power
for auditor change. I exclude one explanatory variable in each of the regressions from (4) to (10) and the
Pseudo R2 in regression (4) is the smallest, indicating that controlling shareholder change is the most powerful
explanation for auditor change.
Table 8 presents robustness tests for the auditor change regressions. The ﬁrst column, “Exclude sample,”
means that observations in which the controlling shareholder changes and shares are transferred within the
same state-controlled group or there is a free transfer between two state-controlled entities are excluded. These
two types of controlling shareholder change are not commonly referred to as controlling rights transfers. The
regression results are similar to those in Table 7. I also divide the sample into three periods: 1997–2000, 2001–
2006 and 2007–2009, because the institutional environment changed over these sample periods. In 2001, there
was the YinGuangXia aﬀair. In 2007, the new accounting standards and auditing standards began to be imple-
mented. The regression results are similar to those in Table 7.
I do not control for auditor resignations, as companies usually do not report the reason for auditor
changes. However, I can say that the probability of auditor resignation is slim for companies with positive
ROA and companies that receive clean opinions, because these companies have relatively low audit risk.
Therefore, I divide the sample into four sub-samples according to the variables Nonclean and ROA. For
the sub-sample with Nonclean = 0 and ROAP 0, the regression results are similar to those in Table 7, indi-
cating that the main ﬁndings in Table 7 are robust. For the sub-sample with Nonclean = 0 and ROA < 0, theTable 7
Auditor change regressions.
AuditorChange (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Holderchange 1.13***
(0.000)
0.99***
(0.000)
1.07***
(0.000)
1.06***
(0.000)
1.01***
(0.000)
1.04***
(0.000)
1.01***
(0.000)
1.01***
(0.000)
Businesschange 0.61***
(0.000)
0.51***
(0.004)
1.09***
(0.000)
0.53***
(0.003)
0.54***
(0.002)
0.64***
(0.000)
0.50***
(0.004)
0.47***
(0.004)
Chairmanchange 0.38***
(0.000)
0.29***
(0.000)
0.42***
(0.000)
0.30***
(0.000)
0.38***
(0.000)
0.32***
(0.000)
0.28***
(0.000)
0.31***
(0.000)
CEOchange 0.34***
(0.000)
0.27***
(0.000)
0.31***
(0.000)
0.28***
(0.000)
0.36***
(0.000)
0.28***
(0.000)
0.27***
(0.000)
0.30***
(0.000)
Nonclean 0.97***
(0.000)
0.77***
(0.000)
0.83***
(0.000)
0.80***
(0.000)
0.79***
(0.000)
0.78***
(0.000)
0.76***
(0.000)
0.96***
(0.000)
Merged 1.57***
(0.000)
1.55***
(0.000)
1.58***
(0.000)
1.55***
(0.000)
1.55***
(0.000)
1.55***
(0.000)
1.52***
(0.000)
1.57***
(0.000)
ROA 1.15***
(0.000)
0.90***
(0.000)
0.97***
(0.000)
0.87***
(0.000)
0.95***
(0.000)
0.94***
(0.000)
1.60***
(0.000)
0.90***
(0.000)
Cons. 3.21***
(0.000)
3.64***
(0.000)
3.51***
(0.000)
3.41***
(0.000)
3.54***
(0.000)
3.47***
(0.000)
3.45***
(0.000)
3.35***
(0.000)
3.51***
(0.000)
3.69***
(0.000)
Year dummies Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control
Pseudo R2 0.0473 0.0474 0.0750 0.0628 0.0740 0.0733 0.0734 0.0659 0.0668 0.0733
N 14,285 14,285 14,285 14,285 14,285 14,285 14,285 14,285 14,285 14,285
*** Indicates signiﬁcance at 1%. 122 companies in the ﬁnance industry are excluded.
Table 8
Robustness tests for auditor change regressions.
AuditorChange Exclude sample 1997–2000 2001–2006 2007–2009 Nonclean = 0 Nonclean = 1
ROAP 0 ROA < 0 ROAP 0 ROA < 0
Holderchange 1.08*** (0.000) 0.92*** (0.000) 0.97*** (0.000) 1.11*** (0.000) 1.02*** (0.000) 0.98*** (0.000) 0.95*** (0.001) 1.01*** (0.000)
Businesschange 0.43** (0.018) 0.49 (0.267) 0.49* (0.063) 0.56** (0.050) 0.99*** (0.000) 0.83* (0.095) 0.14 (0.743) 0.03 (0.939)
Chairmanchange 0.27*** (0.001) 0.24 (0.196) 0.26** (0.017) 0.38*** (0.007) 0.35*** (0.000) 0.38* (0.083) 0.09 (0.712) 0.02 (0.919)
CEOchange 0.27*** (0.000) 0.31* (0.075) 0.24** (0.020) 0.29** (0.034) 0.28*** (0.003) 0.53** (0.013) 0.17 (0.477) 0.12 (0.535)
Nonclean 0.79*** (0.000) 0.63*** (0.002) 0.88*** (0.000) 0.68*** (0.000)
Merged 1.65*** (0.000) 1.73*** (0.000) 1.84*** (0.000) 1.21*** (0.000) 1.47*** (0.000) 1.89*** (0.000) 2.60** (0.023) 1.74*** (0.004)
ROA 0.87*** (0.000) 0.78 (0.154) 0.84*** (0.001) 1.02*** (0.001) 0.75* (0.089) 1.80** (0.011) 1.01 (0.279) 0.76** (0.049)
Cons. 3.43*** (0.000) 3.49*** (0.000) 2.92*** (0.000) 2.60*** (0.000) 3.56*** (0.000) 3.29*** (0.000) 2.50*** (0.001) 19.3*** (0.000)
Year dummy Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control
Pseudo R2 0.0755 0.0721 0.0777 0.0706 0.0431 0.0933 0.0690 0.0591
N 14,006 2850 7009 4426 11,348 1320 778 839
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at 1% levels.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at 5% levels.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at 10% levels.
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Table 9
Auditor change regressions according to the method of controller change.
AuditorChange
Holderchange1 1.03*** (0.000)
Holderchange2 0.69*** (0.000)
Businesschange 0.41** (0.021)
Chairmanchange1 0.43*** (0.000)
Chairmanchange2 0.09 (0.426)
CEOchange1 0.31*** (0.001)
CEOchange2 0.23** (0.012)
Nonclean 0.76*** (0.000)
Merged 1.57*** (0.000)
ROA 0.88*** (0.000)
Cons. 3.50*** (0.000)
Year dummy control
Pseudo R2 0.0766
N 14,285
* Indicate signiﬁcance at 10% levels.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at 1% levels.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at 5% levels.
Table 10
The eﬀects of the identity of the successor controlling shareholder on auditor change.
Identity of the successor controlling shareholder N The probability of
auditor change (%)
Scalechange
N 1/4 Median 3/4
Local government 328 14.6 28 0.71 1.44 2.47
Other-province government 70 41.4 21 0.30 0.67 1.02
Local private 148 23.0 23 0.73 1.19 1.74
Other-province private 278 26.6 48 0.64 0.97 1.89
Central government and university 198 28.8 43 1.00 2.75 4.13
G. Tu /China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 45–58 55coeﬃcients for Businesschange and Chairmanchange are positive, though only marginally signiﬁcant. This may
be due to the small sample size. For the sub-sample with Nonclean = 1, the coeﬃcients for Businesschange,
Chairmanchange and CEOchange are insigniﬁcant. Maybe there are more complicated reasons for these com-
panies changing auditors. For all sub-samples, the coeﬃcient for Holderchange is large and signiﬁcantly posi-
tive and, once again, this means that compared to chairman and CEO changes, controlling shareholder
changes have a stronger eﬀect on auditor changes.
In Table 9, Holderchange1 = 1 for companies with a TYPE I controlling shareholder change. Holder-
change2 = 1 for companies with a TYPE II controlling shareholder change. Chairmanchange1 = 1 for compa-
nies with chairman change and the successor chairman comes from outside. Chairmanchange2 = 1 for
companies with chairman change and the successor chairman comes from inside. CEOchange1 = 1 for com-
panies with CEO change and the successor CEO comes from outside. CEOchange2 = 1 for companies with
CEO change and the successor CEO comes from inside.
The coeﬃcients for Holderchange1 and Holderchange2 are signiﬁcantly positive, and the coeﬃcient for
Holderchange1 is larger than that for Holderchange2, indicating that compared to a TYPE II controlling
shareholder change, a TYPE I controlling shareholder change has a stronger eﬀect on auditor change. The
coeﬃcient for Chairmanchange1 is signiﬁcantly positive and the coeﬃcient for Chairmanchange2 is insigniﬁ-
cant, indicating that a successor from outside aﬀects auditor change, whereas a successor from inside does
not. This may be because an inside successor would have held a previous top management position (usually
vice-chairman or CEO) and thus would already have been acquainted with the incumbent auditor. The coef-
ﬁcients for CEOchange1 and CEOchange2 are signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that CEO change aﬀects audi-
tor change, no matter where the successor comes from.
Table 11
Regression on the eﬀects of the identity of the successor controlling shareholder on auditor
change.
Scalechange (1) (2)
Other-province-state 0.963* (0.073) 1.058* (0.054)
Central 0.972** (0.018) 0.966** (0.024)
Buyper 3.862 (0.475)
Buyper2 7.087 (0.264)
Sellerper 1.756 (0.384)
Leverchange 0.087 (0.615)
Cons. 2.048* (0.086)
Year dummy Control
Adj. R2 0.056 0.115
N 163 163
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at 1% levels.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at 5% levels.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at 10% levels.
56 G. Tu /China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 45–583.7. How does the successor controlling shareholder choose an auditor?
In Table 10, I divide the sample companies with controlling shareholder changes into ﬁve sub-samples
according to the identities of the successor controlling shareholders. “Local” (“Other-province”) means that
the ultimate controller is located in (out of) the province of the sample company, but isn’t the central govern-
ment. Table 10 shows that other-province (local) governments are more (less) likely to change auditors. Of
those companies with local governments as the successor controlling shareholder, 88% were already controlled
by local governments before the controlling shareholder change. There are 39 companies with local govern-
ments as the successor controlling shareholder that were not previously controlled by local governments.
The probability of auditor change of these 39 companies is 20.5%. If both the controlling shareholder and
the auditor change, how does the successor controlling shareholder choose a new auditor? The variable Scale-
change is the revenue of the successor auditor/revenue of the predecessor auditor. The sample period for
“Scalechange” is 2002–2009 because revenue data is unavailable before 2002. Table 10 shows that controlling
shareholders controlled by central governments and universities are more likely to choose larger auditors and
controlling shareholders controlled by other-province governments are more likely to choose smaller auditors.
Table 11 is the regression of the eﬀects of the identity of the successor controlling shareholder on auditor
change. The dependent variable Scalechange is the revenue of the successor auditor/revenue of the predecessor
auditor. The explanatory variables are as follows.
Other-province-state = 1 if the successor controlling shareholder is controlled by an other-province govern-
ment, and 0 otherwise. Central = 1 if the successor controlling shareholder is controlled by the central govern-
ment or a university, and 0 otherwise. Buyper is the percentage of the outstanding shares controlled by the
controlling shareholder. Sellerper is the percentage of shares retained by the predecessor controlling share-
holder. Leverchange is the ratio of the year-end leverage to the leverage of the previous year. Scalechange
and Leverchange are winsorized at 2% to mitigate the inﬂuence of outliers. Table 11 shows that the coeﬃcient
for Other-province-state is signiﬁcantly negative and the coeﬃcient for Central is signiﬁcantly positive, indicat-
ing that controlling shareholders controlled by central governments and universities are more likely to choose
larger auditors, whereas those controlled by other-province governments are more likely to choose smaller
auditors.
In Table 12, the sample includes those companies with auditor changes and controlling shareholder changes
in which the predecessor and successor controlling shareholders are not from the same province, but excludes
companies in which the predecessor auditor and the successor controlling shareholder are from the same prov-
ince. It also excludes companies in which the successor controlling shareholder is an individual or not from
mainland China. Table 12 shows that compared to companies acquired by other-province private acquirers,
companies acquired by other-province government controlled acquirers are more likely to choose auditors
located in the province of the acquirers. Taken together, Tables 10–12 show that if the successor controlling
Table 12
The probability of the successor auditor being from the same province as the successor controlling shareholder.
Identity of the successor controlling
shareholder
N The probability of the successor auditor being from the
same province as the successor controlling shareholder (%)
Other-province government 31 45.2
Other-province private 64 25.0
Diﬀerence 20.2
G. Tu /China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 45–58 57shareholder is controlled by an other-province government, the auditor is more likely to be replaced and the
successor auditor is more likely to be a smaller auditor from the same province as the new controlling
shareholder.
4. Conclusion
Auditor change and auditor choice have received considerable attention because they may aﬀect auditor
quality. The literature on auditor change has mainly focused on qualiﬁed opinions and the literature on audi-
tor choice has generally examined the inﬂuence of company factors, such as information asymmetry and
agency costs, on auditor choice. This study hypothesizes that the controller, including the controlling share-
holder, chairman and the CEO, aﬀects the choice of auditor. The results show that auditor changes are inﬂu-
enced by changes in the controlling shareholder, the main business, the chairman and the CEO, and the
auditor is more likely to change with more extensive changes in the controller. If the successor controlling
shareholder is controlled by an other-province government, the auditor is more likely to be replaced and
the successor auditor is more likely to be a smaller auditor from the same province as the new controlling
shareholder.
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